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On the Neural Enrichment of Economic Models:  
 
 
Recasting the Challenge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In a recent article in this Journal, Fumagalli (2011) argues that economists 
are provisionally justified in resisting prominent calls to integrate neural 
variables into economic models of choice. In other articles, various 
authors engage with Fumagalli’s argument and try to substantiate three 
often-made claims concerning neuroeconomic modelling. First, the 
benefits derivable from neurally informing some economic models of 
choice do not involve significant tractability costs. Second, 
neuroeconomic modelling is best understood within Marr’s three-level of 
analysis framework for information-processing systems. And third, neural 
findings enable choice modellers to confirm the causal relevance of 
variables posited by competing economic models, identify causally 
relevant variables overlooked by existing models, and explain observed 
behavioural variability better than standard economic models. In this 
paper, I critically examine these three claims and respond to the related 
criticisms of Fumagalli’s argument. Moreover, I qualify and extend 
Fumagalli’s account of how trade-offs between distinct modelling 
desiderata hamper neuroeconomists’ attempts to improve economic 
models of choice. I then draw on influential neuroeconomic studies to 
argue that even the putatively best available neural findings fail to 
substantiate current calls for a neural enrichment of economic models. 
 
Keywords: Scientific Modelling; Economic Choice; Neuro-biological 
Integration; Modelling Pluralism; Neuroeconomics. 
 
        Word count: 8350 
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1. Introduction 
 
The proponents of neuroeconomics (henceforth, NE) frequently advocate 
integrating neural variables into economic models of choice (see e.g. 
Camerer, 2008, Glimcher, 2010, ch.12-15, and Loewenstein et al., 2008). 
In their view, this integration enables economists to discriminate between 
competing models of choice and build more predictive and explanatory 
models. In a recent article in this Journal, Fumagalli (2011) argues that 
these calls for a neural enrichment of economic models (henceforth, 
NEEM) face pressing pragmatic and epistemic challenges. In particular, 
he articulates a ‘refined argument from tractability’ to demonstrate that 
economists are provisionally justified in resisting neuroeconomists’ 
(henceforth, NEs) calls for NEEM. Fumagalli’s argument builds on the 
trade-offs between the modelling desiderata valued by NEs (e.g. fit with 
the available neural findings) and by other economists (e.g. tractability) 
respectively. The idea is that these desiderata make dissimilar demands on 
modellers and that these trade-offs, in turn, hamper NEs’ attempts to 
improve economic models of choice.1 
 
In other articles, various authors engage with Fumagalli’s argument and 
try to substantiate three often-made claims concerning NE modelling. 
First, “for at least some economic model of choice behaviour, the benefits 
derivable from neurally informing [this] economic model do not involve 
special tractability costs” (Colombo, 2015, 713; see also Camerer, 2008, 
and Loewenstein et al., 2008). Second, NE modelling “is best understood 
within Marr’s three-level of analysis framework” for information-
processing systems (Colombo, 2015, 713; see also Glimcher, 2003, and 
Kable and Glimcher, 2009). And third, neural findings enable choice 
modellers to confirm the causal relevance of variables posited by 
competing economic models, identify causally relevant variables 
overlooked by existing models, and explain observed behavioural 
variability better than standard economic models (Colombo, 2015, 715-7; 
see also Fehr and Rangel, 2011, Quartz, 2008, and Rustichini, 2009). Let 
us call these three claims tractability thesis, Marr thesis and relevance 
thesis respectively. 
 
In this paper, I critically examine these three theses and respond to the 
related criticisms of Fumagalli’s (2011) argument. Moreover, I qualify 
and extend Fumagalli’s account of how trade-offs between distinct 
modelling desiderata hamper NEs’ attempts to improve economic models. 
I then argue that in spite of recent integrative advances at the interface 
between NE’s parent disciplines, the proponents of NE have failed to 
substantiate their calls for NEEM. The contents are organized as follows. 
In Section 2, I examine the tractability thesis and argue that it fails to 
address the challenge that Fumagalli’s refined argument from tractability 
poses to the proponents of NEEM. In Section 3, I focus on the Marr thesis 
and argue that it stands in tension with important tenets of Marr’s (1982) 
framework and is vulnerable to hitherto unaddressed objections. In 
Section 4, I draw on a useful analytical framework put forward by 
Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) to assess the relevance of NE findings 
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for the economic modelling of choice. In particular, I inspect influential 
NE studies of the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice that have been 
claimed to inform economic modelling in all the three respects indicated 
by the relevance thesis. I then argue that even these selected NE 
contributions lack the evidential and explanatory relevance for economic 
modelling required to substantiate the proffered calls for NEEM. My 
critical appraisal does not exclude the possibility that neural findings can 
provide economists with an additional source of evidence to assess 
existing models (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009, and Kuorikoski and 
Marchionni, 2016) and develop novel models of choice (see e.g. Dean, 
2013, and Krajbich and Dean, 2015). Still, it makes it pressing for the 
proponents of NEEM to put forward more convincing reasons and 
evidence to support their calls to incorporate neural variables into 
economic models of choice.2 
 
Before proceeding, three preliminary caveats are in order. First, in this 
paper I focus on neural - rather than biological - variables since recent 
progress in neuroscience is especially relevant for assessing the proffered 
calls for NEEM. However, I shall speak of neural variables broadly to 
include neuro-biological variables into this category. Moreover, I shall 
refer in various places to the literature on modelling in neuro-biology, 
highlighting some parallel concerns regarding the integration of neural 
and biological variables into economic models (see e.g. Matthewson and 
Weisberg, 2009, on the existence and significance of trade-offs between 
distinct modelling desiderata; see also Boone and Piccinini, 2016, on the 
relevance of tractability considerations for economic and neuro-biological 
modelling). Second, in the NE literature various authors advocate claims 
that resemble the tractability thesis, the Marr thesis and the relevance 
thesis. Below I devote particular attention to Colombo (2015) because this 
article directly engages with Fumagalli’s challenges and offers a 
commendably clear formulation of these theses. Still, as I illustrate in 
Sections 2-4, my remarks also bear on other prominent calls for such 
theses. In this perspective, Colombo’s article can be seen as an interesting 
test case that nicely exemplifies the severity of the evidential and 
explanatory challenges faced by the proponents of NEEM. 
 
Finally, my aim is not merely to provide a critical response to the 
proponents of NEEM, but also to advance the ongoing philosophical 
debate about the prospects of the interdisciplinary modelling of choice 
(see e.g. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010, Ross, 2008 and 2011, Vromen, 
2007 and 2011, and Weisberg, 2007a and 2007b). More specifically, I aim 
to advance this debate in three respects of general interest to scientific 
modellers and philosophers of science, namely: identify some major 
divergences in the methodological presuppositions and the explanatory 
goals of choice modellers across distinct decision sciences; clarify these 
divergences’ implications for the relevance of neural findings for the 
economic modelling of choice; and explicate the most pressing evidential 
and explanatory challenges that hinder interdisciplinary integration at the 
interface between economics, psychology and neuro-biology. 
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2. The Tractability Thesis and Modelling Trade-offs 
 
The tractability thesis states that “for at least some economic model of 
choice, the benefits derivable from neurally informing [this] economic 
model do not involve special tractability costs”, i.e. tractability costs that 
“are too high and specifically due to neurally informing [such] model” 
(Colombo, 2015, 713 and 716; see also Camerer, 2008). The notion of 
tractability has been characterized in several ways by choice modellers. 
For instance, Fumagalli (2011, 621) takes the number of variables 
appearing in a model as “an approximate indicator of its tractability” that 
provides “a convenient rule of thumb for comparing alternative modelling 
frameworks” (2011, 622; see also Kahneman, 2003). For his part, 
Colombo contends that complexity theory, which characterizes a model’s 
tractability in terms of “the time a Turing machine needs for [finding a 
solution to] the model”, provides a more ‘reliable’ indicator of tractability 
than the indicator used by Fumagalli (2015, 726). I am not persuaded by 
Colombo’s contention regarding these two indicators of tractability (see 
e.g. Hindriks, 2006, on various differences between economists’ and 
computer scientists’ use of ‘tractability’; see also Boone and Piccinini, 
2016, on the contrast between solvability and tractability in neuro-
computational modelling). In particular, I fail to see why exactly the 
modelling costs involved in NEEM should be assessed in terms of 
Colombo’s complexity theory indicator of tractability as opposed to other 
indicators of tractability. Still, below I gloss over this definitional concern 
since my main challenge to the tractability thesis holds irrespective of 
whether one adopts Fumagalli’s or Colombo’s indicator of tractability. Let 
me expand on this challenge.3 
 
In articulating his argument, Fumagalli (2011, 627) acknowledges that the 
workings of the human neural architecture can be occasionally modelled 
without using many neural variables (see e.g. Schultz et al., 1997, on the 
dopaminergic underpinnings of basic reward valuation tasks). In his view, 
constructing descriptively accurate and neurally informed economic 
models of choice does not always require NEs to represent the neural 
substrates of choice down to their tiniest details (e.g. size and number of 
ion channels, number and strength of synaptic connections). However, 
when it comes to modelling the wide range of decision problems targeted 
by economists (e.g. choosing between heterogeneous multi-attribute 
financial portfolios, choosing between alternative careers), “accurately 
representing the neural substrates of choice […] would typically impose 
significant tractability costs” (Fumagalli, 2011, 628, italics added). 
Fumagalli bolsters this typicality claim with two often-made observations. 
First, several neural areas that contribute to decision making “activate in a 
wide range of decision contexts” (ibid., 628; see also Bernheim, 2009, and 
Weiskopf, 2016). And second, “even the execution of simple experimental 
tasks typically engages several areas, with additional variability resulting 
when it comes to solving decision problems” (Fumagalli, 2011, 628; see 
also Muldoon and Bassett, 2016, and Vromen, 2010a). 
 
According to Colombo (2015, 722), neither of these observations licenses 
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the claim that providing descriptively accurate representations of the 
neural substrates of choice requires one to use many neural variables. In 
particular, he contends that “there are already descriptively accurate, 
tractable economic models of choice that incorporate neural [variables]” 
(ibid., 715). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this contention is 
correct. Even so, it remains unclear how such contention is supposed to 
bear against Fumagalli’s typicality claim that, when it comes to modelling 
the wide range of decision problems targeted by economists, “accurately 
representing the neural substrates of choice […] would typically impose 
significant tractability costs” (2011, 628, italics added). To undermine this 
typicality claim, a proponent of NEEM would have to demonstrate not 
just that NEs have developed some descriptively accurate and tractable 
models of the neural substrates of choice, but also that NEs can provide 
such models for a wide range of decision problems targeted by 
economists. Regrettably, the proponents of NEEM have hitherto failed to 
meet this justificatory requirement.4 
 
To be sure, Colombo puts forward a detailed case study to vindicate NEs’ 
calls for NEEM with regard to a class of models putatively used in several 
economic contexts. Moreover, he challenges Fumagalli and “whoever 
believes that, currently, a neural enrichment of economic models [would 
typically impose significant tractability costs] on economists [to] provide 
actual case studies in support of [this belief]” (2015, 716). I shall provide 
a detailed assessment of Colombo’s case study in Section 4. For now, I 
note that it is hard to discern how stringently Colombo’s demand for case 
studies should be interpreted (e.g. how many case studies would be 
required to vindicate Fumagalli’s typicality claim?). Furthermore, it 
remains difficult to see why exactly support for Fumagalli’s typicality 
claim should consist of particular case studies as opposed to empirical or 
methodological considerations (e.g. tractability considerations) that 
purport to hold across case studies. At any rate, focusing on a few selected 
case studies does not per se enable the proponents of NEEM to address 
the challenge posed by Fumagalli’s refined argument from tractability. 
For this challenge concerns the wide range of decision problems targeted 
by economists rather than a few selected case studies.5 
 
 
3. The Marr Thesis and the Goals of NE 
 
According to the Marr thesis, NE modelling “is best understood within 
Marr’s three-level of analysis framework” for information-processing 
systems (Colombo, 2015, 713). Marr (1982, 20-29) posits the following 
tripartition between the computational, algorithmic and physical 
implementation levels of analysis of information-processing systems (e.g. 
the visual system). Computational analyses aim to specify what 
information-processing problems are faced by the examined system in 
terms of specific input-output mappings. Algorithmic analyses explicate 
how inputs and outputs are represented, and what algorithms putatively 
transform the system’s inputs into the observed outputs. Finally, physical 
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implementation analyses aim to identify what physical substrates 
implement the system’s representations and algorithmic operations.6 
 
Various leading NEs (e.g. Glimcher, 2003, ch.6-8, and Kable and 
Glimcher, 2009) take Marr’s framework to provide a plausible way to 
understand NEs’ contributions to the interdisciplinary modelling of 
choice. The idea is that economic models at the computational level target 
“the kinds of functions that can be optimized by a given type of 
behaviour”, NE models at the algorithmic level identify “the processes by 
which that behaviour can be carried out”, and neuro-biological models at 
the physical implementation level target “the neural structures and 
activities that implement a given algorithm” (Colombo, 2015, 729). 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that NE modelling can be plausibly 
understood within Marr’s framework along these lines (see e.g. Dean, 
2013). This falls short of licensing the stronger ‘Marr thesis’ that NE 
modelling “is best understood” within such framework (Colombo, 2015, 
713). Moreover, as I argue below, the ‘Marr thesis’ stands in profound 
tension with Marr’s own emphasis on the formal independence of distinct 
levels of analysis. This, in turn, casts doubt on the alleged superiority of a 
Marrian conceptualization of NE modelling over other conceptualizations. 
 
According to Marr (1982, ch.1; see also Marr et al., 1979), performing 
informative analyses of information-processing systems requires one to 
identify precisely what information-processing problems are faced by 
such systems. As documented by subsequent studies, severe difficulties 
plague attempts to identify such problems (see e.g. Anderson, 2015, and 
Warren, 2012, on Marr’s attempts to identify the information-processing 
problems faced by the visual system). This identification task is even 
more difficult when it comes to extending Marr’s analysis of basic visual 
perception tasks to other cognitive activities (see e.g. Shagrir and Bechtel, 
2015, on episodic memory) and the decision problems targeted by 
economists (see e.g. Harrison, 2008, on choices involving multiple 
computational goals simultaneously). These identification problems, 
combined with the fact that many different algorithms can solve specific 
computational problems and many different neural substrates can 
implement the investigated algorithms (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009; see also 
Marr, 1982, ch.1), make it hard to see why exactly NE modelling would 
be ‘best understood’ within Marr’s framework. 
 
To be fair, NEs may alleviate some of these identification and 
underdetermination problems by triangulating findings from different 
levels of analysis (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Marchionni, 2016, and Quartz, 
2008, on how neural and algorithmic findings may constrain 
computational theories). Yet, the point remains that according to Marr 
“the three levels are only rather loosely related”, so that several 
phenomena “may be [modelled and] explained at only one or two of 
them” (1982, 25; see also Kaplan, 2011). Indeed, Marr adamantly insists 
that “from an information-processing point of view [it is] the level of 
computational theory, which is critically important” (ibid., 27) and that 
“computational theory [is] independent of the algorithm or 
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implementation levels” (ibid., 337; see also Craver and Alexandrova, 
2008). These remarks do not imply that decision problems are best 
modelled independently at the computational, algorithmic and physical 
implementation levels (see e.g. Boone and Piccinini, 2016). Still, they cast 
doubt on the thesis that NE interdisciplinary modelling is ‘best 
understood’ within Marr’s framework. In particular, they challenge the 
proponents of this thesis to specify which tenets of Marr’s framework 
substantiate such a thesis. 
 
These considerations, in turn, have critical implications for the alleged 
superiority of a Marrian conceptualization of NE research over different 
conceptualizations. To see this, consider Colombo’s claim that “once it is 
clear that the relevant notion of a level used in [NE modelling] is Marr’s 
one”, then it becomes evident that “asking whether ‘human choice 
behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural - rather than some 
other - level’ is a misunderstanding of [NE] methodology” (2015, 729, 
italics added). This claim invites the following two-fold rejoinder. First, it 
is highly doubtful that one single notion of level is ‘the relevant’ notion of 
level in NE modelling in general. For different notions of level may be 
relevant in different modelling contexts, depending on factors such as 
modellers’ pragmatic purposes and the epistemic interests of their target 
audiences (see e.g. Craver, 2005, and Mäki, 2009 and 2010). And second, 
the hitherto proffered claims that ‘the relevant’ notion of level in NE 
modelling is Marr’s one fall short of implying that asking whether human 
choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural - rather than 
some other - level is a misunderstanding of NE. For one may consistently 
use the term ‘level’ to indicate both distinct scientific disciplines and 
different levels of analysis in Marr’s sense. In fact, several leading NEs 
use the term ‘level’ in both senses when presenting and discussing their 
findings. For instance, Glimcher advocates a Marrian conceptualization of 
NE modelling, yet repeatedly speaks of ‘levels’ with reference to 
scientific disciplines (see e.g. 2003, ch.6-8, and 2010, ch.2). In particular, 
he holds that “the goal of [NE] is to produce a single unified model of 
human decision making that spans the economic, psychological, and 
neuroscientific levels of analysis” (2010, 4).7 
 
These pluralistic remarks about NE modelling also hold for prominent 
characterizations of the goals of NE. To see this, consider Colombo’s 
contention that “all characterizations [agree that] the goal of [NE] is an 
algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice” (2015, 728). 
This contention fits prominent characterizations of the goals of NE (see 
e.g. Glimcher, 2010, ch.8). However, it seemingly overlooks that not all 
entrenched approaches to NE research aim to provide an algorithmic 
description of the human mechanism for choice (see e.g. Ross, 2008, on 
so-called behavioural economics in the scanner; see also Montague, 2007, 
on two ‘natural neuroeconomics’, which respectively investigate 
algorithms and the efficient operation of neural tissue). Furthermore, 
several authors privilege other levels of analysis over the algorithmic one 
in their characterizations of NE modelling (see e.g. Rangel et al., 2008, 
545, for the claim that “it is the computations that are central to uniting 
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[distinct] levels”). These observations do not exclude the possibility that 
various NE studies may be regarded as attempts to identify “indirect ways 
of ultimately getting at [algorithms]” (Colombo, personal 
correspondence). Still, they cast doubt on the claim that providing an 
algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice is ‘the’ (or 
even ‘the main’) goal of NE. To put it differently, reiterating that “all 
characterizations” of NE agree that “the goal of [NE] is an algorithmic 
description of the human mechanism for choice” provides a simplistic 
portrayal of NE that fails to fit the diverse goals of NE. 
 
 
4. The Relevance Thesis and the Economic Modelling of Choice  
 
According to the relevance thesis, neural findings enable choice modellers 
to confirm the causal relevance of variables posited by competing 
economic models, identify causally relevant variables overlooked by 
existing models, and explain observed behavioural variability better than 
standard economic models (Colombo, 2015, 715-7; see also Fehr and 
Rangel, 2011, Quartz, 2008, and Rustichini, 2009, for similar claims). In 
this section, I assess whether neural findings inform economic modelling 
in these three respects, focusing on some of the putatively best available 
NE studies. More specifically, I consider an influential NE study Colombo 
takes to exemplify “how results from cognitive neuroscience can be used 
to inform economic models of choice” (2015, 722), namely Niv et al.’s 
(2012) work on the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice. This study 
constitutes an ideal test case for assessing NEs’ contributions, since it 
purportedly “completes a full circle starting from computational theory, 
through the psychology [and] the neural basis [of choice] and back again 
to influence and inform the computational theory” (Niv et al., 2012, 561). 
 
4.1 Experimental Setting and Main Findings 
 
Niv et al. scan sixteen human subjects with fMRI to examine the neural 
substrates of risk-sensitive choice. These subjects earn monetary rewards 
by choosing between different stimuli. Some of these stimuli are 
associated with fixed payoffs, whereas the others are associated with a 
50% probability of receiving specified payoffs (both the fixed and the 
risky stimuli are associated with payoffs in the 0¢-40¢ range). Subjects 
have to learn the payoffs of different stimuli through the experiment. The 
main aim of Niv et al. is to ascertain whether “neural representations 
associated with reinforcement learning […] are sensitive only to mean 
payoffs [or whether] some of the effects of risk on choice may be realized 
through such learning” (2012, 560). 
 
Niv et al. (2012) first document a close correspondence between a 
hypothetical, model-derived reward prediction error and fMRI blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals in the nucleus accumbens. 
They then extract from this prediction error signal the learned values of 
cues that predict rewards of equal mean but different variance, and show 
that “a close […] coupling exists between the fluctuations of [this neural 
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measure of] experience-based evaluations of risky options [and observed 
variations] in behavioral risk aversion” (2012, 551). Finally, Niv et al. 
assess the relative fit with behavioural and neural data of three temporal 
difference learning models of risk-sensitive choice. First, we find a 
standard TD model, which focuses on the mean outcome for each 
stimulus, and does not explicitly take outcome variance into account. 
Second, there is what Niv et al. call utility model, a variant of the standard 
TD model that incorporates nonlinear subjective utilities for the outcomes 
that are integrated into TD learning. And third, we have a risk-sensitive 
TD (RSTD) model, where nonlinearity is associated with the learning 
process itself rather than the evaluation of outcomes. 
 
More formally, in the standard TD model a reward prediction error  
δ(t) = r(t) + V(t) - V(t - 1) 
is computed at each of two consecutive time steps tstimulus and toutcome = 
tstimulus + 1, where V(t) is the predicted value of a given stimulus at time t, 
and r(t) is the reward at time t. The reward prediction error at toutcome is 
used to update V(C), the value of the chosen stimulus, according to 
Vnew(C) = Vold(C) + η δ(toutcome), with η being a learning rate parameter. 
What Niv et al. call utility model has the same update rule as the standard 
TD model, but has a different reward prediction error, namely: 
δ(t) = U[r(t)] + V(t) - V(t - 1) 
where U[r(t)] is the subjective utility of the reward at time t, with U(0) = 
0, U(20) = 20, and U(40) = a 20. In the RSTD-model, reward prediction 
errors are defined as in the standard TD model, but there are separate 
update rules for positive and negative reward prediction errors, namely: 
Vnew (C) = Vold (C) + η
+ 
δ(toutcome), if δ(toutcome) > 0 
Vnew (C) = Vold (C) + η
-
  
δ(toutcome), if δ(toutcome) < 0 
such that if η+< η-, the effect of negative prediction errors on learned 
values is larger than that of positive prediction errors, leading to risk 
aversion, and vice versa if η+> η-. 
 
All these three models assume that subjects use past experience to 
estimate the expected payoffs associated with different stimuli and, given 
a choice, pick between stimuli based on these stimuli’s expected values. 
However, those models yield dissimilar predictions about subjects’ 
behaviour in situations of risk and make different claims about the neural 
substrates of risk-sensitive choice. More specifically, risk aversion “arises 
implicitly” in the standard TD model because “risky stimuli are, by 
definition, associated with outcomes that are larger or smaller than their 
means”, so that “learned predictive values […] fluctuate above and below 
the mean according to the specific sequence of past experienced rewards” 
(Niv et al., 2012, 555). In the so-called utility model, instead, risk-
sensitive preferences “emerge because the two options that have 
objectively been designated as having the same mean payoff do not lead 
to an equal subjective mean reward” (ibid., 556). Again differently, in the 
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RSTD model risk sensitivity arises because positive and negative 
prediction errors have asymmetric effects on learning. In the words of Niv 
et al., “if negative errors have the effect of decreasing [the updated value 
of the chosen stimulus] more than positive errors increase it, then the 
learned value will be lower than the mean nominal outcome, leading to 
risk aversion. Conversely, higher learning rates for positive compared to 
negative prediction errors will [lead to] overestimation of the values of 
risky options and thus to risk seeking” (ibid., 556). 
 
Niv et al. (2012, 556-7) compare the ‘posterior likelihoods’ of each 
subject’s choice data according to each of the three models, and find that 
the RSTD model fits the behavioural data better than the other two models 
almost for every subject. They then compare the three models’ predictions 
to neural measurements of the learned values of the stimuli and, again, 
find that the RSTD model fits the neural data better than the other two 
models. In their view, these findings indicate that risk sensitivity “is 
indeed present in prediction error signaling in the nucleus accumbens, 
with a direct correlation between the risk-averse or risk-seeking choices of 
[experimental] subjects and the neural prediction error signals” (2012, 
561). These findings, in turn, allegedly suggest that risk sensitivity “as in 
RSTD learning, should be imported into computational models of human 
choice” (ibid., 561). 
 
4.2 Evaluation 
 
Niv et al.’s findings have been claimed to inform the economic modelling 
of choice in all the three respects indicated by the relevance thesis. More 
specifically, these findings putatively: (1) “confirm (or disconfirm) the 
causal relevance of latent, subjective variables or processes posited by 
competing [economic] models of choice” (Colombo, 2015, 715; see also 
Niv et al., 2012, 551); (2) “point to causally relevant variables or 
processes overlooked by existing models” (Colombo, 2015, 715; see also 
Niv et al., 2012, 551); and (3) “explain [observed] behavioral variability 
both computationally and neurally, by contrasting three possible 
explanations for risk-sensitive choice” (Niv et al., 2012, 555; see also 
Colombo, 2015, 717). Below I draw on a useful analytical framework put 
forward by Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) to examine these three 
purported contributions in sequence. I shall argue that Niv et al.’s study 
improves over former NE works on risk-sensitive choice (e.g. Hsu et al., 
2009) by clearly specifying in what respects neural findings supposedly 
inform the economic modelling of choice. Still, even this selected study 
lacks the evidential and explanatory relevance for economic modelling 
required to substantiate the proffered calls for NEEM. 
 
4.2.1 Confirming the causal relevance of latent variables 
 
According to Colombo, “the main benefit” of Niv et al.’s study for 
economic modellers consists in “a kind of independent test of competing 
models of risk-sensitive choice” (2015, 717, italics added). The analytical 
framework put forward by Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) provides a 
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helpful basis for explicating and assessing this alleged contribution. This 
framework conceptualizes the economic modelling of choice as an attempt 
to identify how an individual’s choices are causally influenced by a set of 
conditions that the individual regards as fixed (or at least predetermined). 
The framework takes economic modellers to assume that some function f: 
y = f (x, ω) maps a set of observed explanatory variables x (e.g. prices) 
and a set of unobserved environmental variables ω (e.g. neural 
activations) on the set of choices y. Standard economic models make no 
explicit assumptions about the neuro-biological substrates of choice and 
treat the unobserved environmental variables as noise. For their part, NEs 
regard standard economic models as a reduced form for the underlying 
neuro-biological processes. More formally, NEs assume that neural 
activations z depend on both observed and unobserved variables through a 
function Z: z = Z (x, ω), with the individual’s choices resulting from a 
function Y: y = Y (z, x, ω). NEs then build on observed neural activations 
and choices to disclose both function Z and function Y, thereby helping 
economic modellers to identify the mapping f (x, ω) = Y (Z(x, ω), x, ω). 
 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Niv et al.’s findings enable choice 
modellers to test competing neuro-biological models by confirming the 
causal relevance of specific neuro-biological variables (e.g. activation 
patterns of particular neural areas) posited by such models. This does not 
per se imply that these findings enable modellers to test competing 
economic - as opposed to neuro-biological - models. To be sure, what Niv 
et al. call utility model does incorporate a functional form frequently used 
by economists, namely nonlinear subjective utilities for outcomes. This, 
however, by no means implies that this model is plausibly regarded as an 
economic - as opposed to a neuro-biological or some other kind of - 
model. For such functional form can be employed to model a wide variety 
of systems besides those targeted by economists (see e.g. Kacelnik and 
Bateson, 1996, on animal foraging, and Ross, 2014a, ch.5, on macro-scale 
physical objects). In this respect, both Colombo and Niv et al. seem to 
take Niv et al.’s findings to inform economic modelling only because they 
employ the term ‘economic’ in an implausibly broad sense.8 
 
This point is not definitional hair-splitting, but has critical implications for 
the alleged relevance of Niv et al.’s findings for the economic modelling 
of choice. To illustrate this, let me contrast two of the claims Colombo 
makes concerning the putative relevance of Niv et al.’s findings for 
economic modellers. In some passages, he claims that these findings 
suggest that “algorithmic models of risk-sensitive […] choice should 
apply a non-linear transformation to prediction errors” (2015, 732, italics 
added). In other places, he puts forward the much stronger contention that 
“any descriptively accurate model of human choice should take account of 
risk sensitivity, as per [Niv et al.’s] risk-sensitive TD-model” (ibid., 722, 
italics added). The former claim highlights the potential import of Niv et 
al.’s findings for NE models of the algorithmic underpinnings of choice. 
The latter contention appears to overstate those findings’ evidential and 
explanatory relevance for economic modellers in at least three major 
respects.  
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First, economists have put forward since the 1980s more predictive and 
sophisticated functional forms than the functional form in Niv et al.’s 
utility model (see e.g. Quiggin, 1982, on rank-dependent expected utility 
models, and Yaari, 1987, on dual expected utility models). Moreover, Niv 
et al. do not give any reason to think that the functional form they favour 
robustly outperforms economists’ best available functional forms. This, in 
turn, significantly constrains the evidential and explanatory relevance of 
Niv et al.’s results for economic modellers. That is to say, the proponents 
of NEEM should examine more predictive and sophisticated functional 
forms than the functional form in Niv et al.’s utility model if they are to 
substantiate their calls to incorporate neural variables into economic 
models (see e.g. Wilcox, 2008 and 2011, on the so-called new structural 
econometrics, which combines distinct functional forms with stochastic 
models to estimate structural risk parameters). 
 
Second, severe limitations affect current attempts to rely on temporal 
difference reinforcement learning models to demonstrate that one 
functional form provides the uniquely best fit with observed choices 
across the real-life choice settings targeted by economists. To be sure, 
temporal difference reinforcement learning models may guide the 
formulation of empirical hypotheses about behavioral relationships, 
possibly leading economists to examine novel specifications in choice 
settings (like the one targeted by Niv et al.) involving the accumulation of 
experience (see e.g. Caplin and Dean, 2008a). Yet, when it comes to the 
real-life choice settings targeted by economists, studies focused solely on 
temporal difference reinforcement learning models lack the potential to 
demonstrate that one functional form robustly fits observed choices better 
than other functional forms. For several learning processes besides 
temporal difference reinforcement learning often influence choices in such 
choice settings (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009, and Krajbich and Dean, 2015).9 
 
And third, inferences about risk attitudes have been shown to vary 
remarkably depending on whether the latent data generating process is 
viewed through the lens of one, two or more models (see e.g. Harrison and 
Rutström, 2008, for detailed illustrations). Moreover, economists have 
developed various statistical tools to estimate the probability that multiple 
latent data generating processes generate the observed choices (see e.g. 
Harrison and Rutström, 2009). Unfortunately, Niv et al.’s comparative 
estimates of individual models’ fit with data do not consider the 
possibility that multiple latent data generating processes generate the 
observed choices. This, in turn, constrains both the informativeness of Niv 
et al.’s comparative estimates and the reliability of Colombo’s claim that 
“any descriptively accurate model of human choice should take account of 
risk sensitivity, as per [Niv et al.’s] risk-sensitive TD-model” (2015, 722). 
 
A proponent of NEEM may object that Niv et al.’s findings are 
evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling on the 
alleged ground that they target phenomena modelled by economists, 
namely observed choices. Economics has often been characterized as a 
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‘science of choice’ during its history (see e.g. Robbins, [1932] 1945, and 
Weber, [1904] 1949, for famous characterizations of economics as a 
science that studies human choice behaviour in presence of scarce means 
having alternative uses). Yet, the mere fact that some findings target 
phenomena modelled by economists falls short of implying that these 
findings are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for the economic 
modelling of choice. To see this, suppose that a particle physicist provided 
a set of statistically significant correlations between an individual’s 
purchase decisions and the micro-physical bodily movements the 
individual implements in performing such decisions. The correlations 
provided by the particle physicist target a phenomenon modelled by 
economists. This, however, by no means implies that these correlations 
are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for the economic modelling of 
choice. In fact, those correlations seem largely orthogonal to economists’ 
evidential and explanatory concerns (see Bernheim, 2009, sec.1, for 
similar remarks about NEs’ correlations between observed choices and 
endogenous brain activity). 
 
A proponent of NEEM may further object that NEs could in principle 
redefine entrenched criteria for demarcating the set of economic models 
so as to imply that any finding targeting observed choices is ipso facto 
evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling. This 
redefinition, however, would trivialize the putative significance of the 
claim that neural findings are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for 
economic modelling. For under such redefinition, findings from all sorts 
of disciplines - ranging from social anthropology to particle physics - 
would be evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling. 
This does not vindicate isolationist characterizations of economics’ 
domain that aprioristically exclude latent neuro-biological variables from 
such domain (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). Still, it challenges NEs 
to provide more nuanced criteria for demarcating the set of economic 
models and assessing the relevance of neural findings for the economic 
modelling of choice. As Ross puts it, “imagine a model that features a 
consumption […] variable on its left-hand side and nothing but 
neurological variables on its right-hand side. This would strike almost all 
economists […] as not being an economic model” (2011, 218). 
 
4.2.2 Pointing to new relevant variables 
 
According to Colombo, Niv et al.’s findings “point to causally relevant 
variables or processes overlooked by existing models” (2015, 715, italics 
added). In his view, these findings help choice modellers to ascertain 
whether traditional reinforcement learning models (e.g. Sutton and Barto, 
1998) “may be extended to take account of [risk sensitivity]”, or whether 
“there might be two separate mechanisms of risk-sensitive choice” (2015, 
718), one by which subjects learn the mean values of different options - as 
per traditional reinforcement learning models - and the other by which 
subjects learn what variance is associated with reward outcomes. Suppose, 
for the sake of argument, that Niv et al.’s findings point to causally 
relevant neuro-biological variables or processes overlooked by existing 
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models of risk-sensitive choice. This result may be highly informative to 
modellers interested in the neuro-biological substrates of decisions. Yet, it 
is unclear how exactly such result bears on the merits of economic - as 
opposed to neuro-biological - models of choice. For economic models do 
not in fact rest on specific presuppositions concerning what neuro-
biological variables or processes underlie risk-sensitive choice (see e.g. 
Fumagalli, 2016b, and Vromen, 2010b). Paraphrasing Dean, economists 
recognize that neuro-biological processes mediate the influence of the 
variables they target (e.g. prices) on choices, yet neuro-biological 
processes “represent neither the environmental [variables] nor the 
behavioral outcomes [targeted by economists]” (2013, 167). 
 
To be fair, NEs’ findings could in principle prompt economists to build 
their models on neuro-biological presuppositions (see e.g. Bernheim, 
2009) and include neuro-biological variables into their models (see e.g. 
Caplin and Dean, 2015). Nonetheless, severe limitations constrain the 
suitability of Niv et al.’s findings to prompt such changes in economic 
modelling. To give one example, Niv et al. investigate the neural 
substrates of stimulus-bound risk-sensitive choices within time spans (e.g. 
up to a few seconds) that are much shorter than those usually targeted by 
economists. Moreover, they provide no evidence that the algorithms they 
hypothesize can be plausibly taken to determine risk-sensitive choice 
when it comes to the long-term non-stimulus-bound choices targeted by 
economists (e.g. think of choices between multi-stage courses of action 
involving abstract rewards). These limitations affect not just Niv et al.’s 
study, but also other influential NE studies of the neural substrates of 
choice (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2016c, and Ross, 2009, for several 
examples).10 
 
More generally, the point remains that identifying and measuring 
variables that causally influence individuals’ choices does not per se 
imply that economists should include these variables into their models. 
My point is not just that individuals’ choices are causally influenced by a 
panoply of variables that few economic modellers would include into their 
models (e.g. the amount of solar radiation to which individuals are 
exposed, how many red blood cells are present in their circulatory 
systems). Rather, my main concern is that activations in the neural areas 
targeted by leading NE models of learning are immediate precursors to 
choices (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013) and that observing these activations 
does not significantly improve economists’ measurement of the causal 
relationship between standard exogenous environmental variables and 
choices (see e.g. Krajbich and Dean, 2015). Furthermore, markets and 
other information-processing scaffolding innovations can demonstrably 
lead individuals who drastically differ in their neuro-biological makeup to 
instantiate observationally equivalent choice patterns (see Ross, 2014b, for 
illustrations). These considerations do not preclude NEs from identifying 
increasingly fine-grained associations between observed choice patterns 
and specific neuro-biological variables (see e.g. Li et al. 2013, and Van 
den Bos et al., 2014, on some neural measures of structural and functional 
connectivity). Still, they challenge the proponents of NEEM to support 
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their calls to incorporate neural variables with more convincing reasons 
and evidence than the claim that neural findings “point to causally 
relevant variables or processes overlooked by existing models” (Colombo, 
2015, 715). In the words of Bernheim, “the burden of proof is squarely on 
[the NEs’] shoulders [to provide] a novel economic model derived 
originally from [NE] research that improves our measurement of the 
causal relationship between a standard exogenous environmental [variable 
and] a standard economic choice” (2009, 26). 
 
4.2.3 Explaining economic choices 
 
Niv et al. “set out to explain [observed] behavioral variability both 
computationally and neurally, by contrasting three possible explanations 
for risk-sensitive choice” (2012, 555, italics added). According to 
Colombo, Niv et al. provide “independent evidence about […] the 
explanatory power of competing economic models of choice” (2015, 722). 
In his view, their findings inform economic modelling by 
“discriminat[ing] the explanatory power of competing economic models 
of choice” (ibid., 722). Let us assess the cogency of these claims. 
 
Niv et al. do not explicate in what sense they employ the term 
‘explanation’ in their study. This makes it difficult to interpret and assess 
their claims concerning the explanatory relevance of their findings. For his 
part, Colombo specifies that for his purposes “to say that a utility function 
‘explains’ some behavioural regularity […] means at least that the 
function fits data relevant to that behavioural regularity […] reasonably 
well” (2015, 717). This specification improves over Niv et al.’s vague use 
of the term ‘explanation’, but is not very precise either (e.g. what does the 
expression ‘reasonably well’ mean? What measure of goodness of fit does 
this expression presuppose?). In particular, Colombo points to a notion 
that is more akin to descriptive fit with data than to the accounts of 
explanation entrenched in NE’s parent disciplines (see e.g. Fumagalli, 
2014, on the unificationist, mechanistic and interventionist accounts). 
Moreover, neither Colombo nor Niv et al. give detailed reasons to think 
that Niv et al.’s findings are explanatory for economists under these 
entrenched accounts. This, in turn, is problematic since those accounts 
concur that data fit alone is not sufficient for explanation (see e.g. Craver, 
2006, Kaplan, 2011, and Ylikoski and Kuorikoski, 2010). 
 
A proponent of NEEM may object that Niv et al.’s findings are 
explanatory for NEs under various accounts of explanation entrenched in 
NE’s parent disciplines (see e.g. Glimcher, 2010, on the mechanistic 
account). Suppose that this objection is correct. This would fall short of 
implying that Niv et al.’s findings are explanatory for other economists. 
For in primis, NEs and other economists frequently endorse dissimilar 
accounts of explanation, which are grounded on different criteria of 
explanatory relevance (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010, for a 
detailed review). And second, even those NEs and economists who 
endorse the same accounts of explanation may give such accounts rather 
different interpretations. By way of illustration, NEs and other economists 
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may endorse a mechanistic account of explanation, yet ground such 
account on distinct notions of mechanism (see e.g. Kuorikoski, 2009, on 
mechanisms as ‘componential causal systems’ versus mechanisms as 
‘abstract forms of interaction’) and make dissimilar assumptions as to 
whether or not providing mechanistic explanations of choices requires one 
to draw on neural findings (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2014). Due to these 
differences, the mere fact that NEs are gaining more detailed 
understanding of the neuro-biological mechanisms underlying choices by 
no means implies that economists should explain choices in terms of such 
mechanisms (see e.g. Dietrich and List, 2016). To put it differently, 
showing that some findings are explanatory for NEs falls short of 
indicating that such findings are explanatory for other economists. 
 
A proponent of NEEM may further object that “in economics as well as in 
philosophy of economics, there is little agreement on what precisely 
constitutes an adequate explanation of [choices]” (Colombo, 2015, 717). 
In particular, she may point out that some leading economists use 
‘explanation’ as a synonym for descriptive fit with data (see e.g. 
Friedman, 1953, 8-9). These considerations are not without merit. Yet, 
once this descriptivist characterization of explanation is adopted, then the 
claim that Niv et al.’s findings are explanatory for economists loses much 
of its bite. For several findings that count as explanatory under such 
descriptivist characterization seem neither informative nor relevant for 
economists. To see this, consider Niv et al.’s finding that the RSTD model 
fits the behavioural data better than the basic TD model and what they call 
‘utility model’. This finding counts as explanatory under the descriptivist 
characterization of explanation adopted by Colombo, but seems neither 
informative nor relevant for economists. For the basic TD model “cannot 
generate” risk-seeking behavior in the experimental setting examined by 
Niv et al. (2012, 555). Moreover, risk sensitivity was formerly shown to 
be incompatible with nonlinear utility in the domain of small payoffs 
targeted by Niv et al. (see e.g. Rabin and Thaler, 2001). 
 
In fact, as Niv et al. (2012, 560) cursorily acknowledge, their findings do 
not even shed light on whether the asymmetric effect that positive and 
negative prediction errors putatively have on subjects’ predictions is fixed 
or varies depending on factors such as subjects’ amount of training, payoff 
variations beyond the 0¢-40¢ range, and the degree of risk involved in the 
examined task. These limitations, in turn, severely constrain the evidential 
and explanatory relevance of Niv et al.’s findings for the modelling of the 
real-life decision problems targeted by economists. For all the mentioned 
factors have been shown to influence experimentally elicited individuals’ 
risk attitudes (see e.g. Harrison and List, 2004, on subjects’ amount of 
training, Andersen et al., 2008, on payoff variations, and Harrison and 
Rutström, 2008, sec.3, on the degree of risk involved in the examined 
task; see also Harrison et al., 2015, for an updated review). That is to say, 
the proponents of NEEM have to meet much more stringent standards of 
experimental rigor and sophistication if they are to substantiate their calls 
to incorporate neural variables into economic models of choice. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In recent years, promising integrative advances have been made at the 
interface between economics, psychology and neuro-biology. In light of 
these advances, it would be implausible to reiterate that most NEs “are in 
the dark” about how their research “will reshape economics” (Rubinstein, 
2008, 486-7) and are “a far cry from [providing] integrated neural and 
economic models” (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2009, 44). Still, the proffered 
calls for NEEM face pressing and hitherto unaddressed evidential and 
explanatory challenges. In this paper, I articulated and defended three 
such challenges, which respectively target the modelling trade-offs 
involved in NE models (tractability thesis), entrenched conceptualizations 
of NE modelling (Marr thesis), and the relevance of neural findings for 
the economic modelling of choice (relevance thesis). My three challenges 
do not exclude the possibility that neural findings can provide economists 
with an additional source of evidence to assess existing models and 
develop novel models of choice. Still, they make it pressing for the 
proponents of NEEM to put forward more convincing reasons and 
evidence to support their calls to incorporate neural variables into 
economic models of choice. 
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1 Fumagalli’s (2011) refined argument from tractability differs from former 
critiques of NE, which prevalently target purported methodological flaws in 
NEs’ studies (see e.g. Harrison, 2008, and Harrison and Ross, 2010), putative 
limitations in the accuracy and reliability of NEs’ findings (see e.g. Bernheim, 
2009, and Rubinstein, 2008), and the alleged irrelevance of such findings for 
economic modellers (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). I shall comment on 
these critiques and their interrelations in various places throughout the paper. 
2 NE findings might foster the development of new methods for measuring 
individuals’ welfare and evaluating policies’ welfare implications on the basis of 
neural activity. I gloss over these potential normative contributions since my 
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evaluation focuses on positive economic analyses. For a discussion of NE’s 
potential contributions to normative economic analyses, see e.g. Bernheim and 
Rangel, 2007, 2008 and 2009, and Fumagalli, 2013 and 2016a. 
3 The term ‘tractability’ may be used to designate not just a property of models, 
but also a property of the activities of modelling, namely “the ease with which 
modellers can build [a] model or manipulate it” (Colombo, 2015, 727). In this 
paper, I focus on tractability as a property of models - rather than the activities of 
modelling - since the controversy about NEEM prevalently concerns the former 
notion (see e.g. Colombo, 2015, 727, for a similar remark). 
4 This justificatory requirement may be regarded as more or less demanding 
depending on how one interprets the expression ‘wide range’. However, this 
interpretative concern has limited bearing on Fumagalli’s challenge. For on most 
plausible interpretations of ‘wide range’, pointing to a few selected descriptively 
accurate and tractable NE models of the neural substrates of choice falls short of 
indicating that NEs can provide such models for a wide range of decision 
problems targeted by economists. 
5 This is not the only respect in which Colombo’s defence of the tractability 
thesis seems to mischaracterize Fumagalli’s argument. Two such 
mischaracterizations are relevant for appraising NEs’ calls for NEEM. First, 
Colombo takes Fumagalli to infer that “since modelling choice behaviour at the 
neural level would involve too high modelling costs in comparison to models 
incorporating variables at some other level, economists should refrain from 
modelling choice behaviour at the neural level” (2015, 715). However, 
Fumagalli (2011, 627-631) repeatedly emphasizes that assessing NEs’ calls for 
NEEM involves a comparative evaluation of both modelling costs and modelling 
benefits. Reconstructing his argument as if it concerned exclusively modelling 
costs oversimplifies both the structure and the implications of such argument 
(see Fumagalli, 2011, 627-631, for discussion). And second, pace Colombo, 
Fumagalli nowhere asserts that “providing a descriptively accurate and tractable 
model of choice prevents economists from incorporating variables at the neural 
level” (2015, 715, italics added). On the contrary, Fumagalli’s argument is 
premised on the pluralistic assumption that economists “may fruitfully combine 
neural and other disciplines’ insights in constructing particular models of choice” 
(2011, 633). In this respect, Colombo appears to miss the pluralistic spirit of 
Fumagalli’s argument (see Weisberg et al., 2011, 613; see also Section 3). 
6 Different positions as to how exactly each level of analysis is to be 
conceptualized have been advocated (see e.g. Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015, 
Kitcher, 1988, and Shagrir, 2010). The remarks in the text are sufficiently 
detailed for the purpose of my evaluation. 
7 A proponent of NE might object that the contrastive character of the question 
whether ‘human choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural - 
rather than some other - level’ does not fit well NEs’ insistence on combining 
findings from multiple disciplines. However, one may consistently acknowledge 
that NEs aim to combine findings from multiple disciplines, yet argue that NEs’ 
attempts to implement such combination face pragmatic and epistemic 
challenges (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2011 and 2013). In this respect, no 
misunderstanding of NE methodology seems inherent in the question whether 
‘human choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural - rather 
than some other - level’. 
8 Niv et al. might rebut that what they call ‘utility model’ is plausibly regarded as 
an economic model on the alleged ground that such model “is the standard 
explanation for risk sensitivity from economics” (Niv et al., 2012, 555). I address 
this rebuttal in point 4.2.3 below. 
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9
 This does not exclude that one may capture nonparametrically the testable 
implications of choice models that contain latent variables. In fact, leading 
economists have already applied rigorous axiomatic approaches to test reward 
prediction error (RPE) models of the same class as those compared by Niv et al. 
For instance, Caplin and Dean (2008b) use an axiomatic approach to test RPE 
models with neuro-biological data and identify three axiomatic conditions that 
characterize the entire class of RPE models in a simple, nonparametric way. 
These axiomatic conditions yield a minimal requirement for RPE models in the 
sense that if neural activity is to satisfy any one of the class of RPE models, then 
such activity must also satisfy those axiomatic conditions (Caplin et al., 2010). 
10 A proponent of NEEM might conjecture that the “heterogeneity of risk 
attitudes at extended timescales might […] be partly explained by people’s 
varying levels of short-timescale […] risk sensitivity” (Colombo, 2015, 726). 
This conjecture highlights the potential of neural findings to shed light on the 
neural substrates of intertemporal behavioural patterns. However, due to the 
limitations constraining the evidential and explanatory relevance of current 
neural findings for the modelling of the real-life decision problems targeted by 
economists (see point 4.2.3 below), such conjecture does not presently support 
the claim that economists should build their models of choice on neuro-
biological presuppositions and include neuro-biological variables into their 
models. 
